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 Music and moral geographies: Constructions of "nation" and identity
 in Singapore
 Lily Kong
 Department of Geography , National University of Singapore, 1 Arts Link, Singapore, 117570, Singapore
 (E-mail: lilykong@nus.edu. sg)
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 Abstract
 In this paper, I attempt to pull together sociological and geographical perspectives in the study of music to
 understand the ways in which pop and rock music are socio-cultural products with political and moral meanings
 and implications. I examine state engineering of moral panics, focusing on a case study of pop and rock music in
 post-independence Singapore. Such engineering is aimed at political and ideological ends, in particular, "nation"-
 building outcomes. In engineering moral panics through both discursive and legislative acts, the contours of a moral
 geography are delineated at various spatial scales. First, at the scale of the national and global, moral geographies
 are inscribed by the state, with the demarcation of national boundaries as the boundaries within which morality
 resides and beyond which belong negative decadent forces. Second, at the scale of the local and everyday, moral
 geographies are constructed in terms of certain nightspots, which are thought to be morally damaging, and to be
 contained. Third, at the spatial scale of the individual self, the body becomes the site of moral judgement. Through
 the policing of all these scales, moral geographies contribute to the construction of desired "Singaporean" identities.
 Inasmuch as geographies are inscribed with moralities, so too music. The "new" "western" sounds of particular
 historical times, and more especially, the performative aspects of music embodying the sensual and the violent, are
 imputed with moral meaning.
 Introduction: music, cultural politics and moral
 geographies
 In this paper, I contribute to the body of critical
 work linking music and geography that has developed
 in recent years, as captured, for example, in Smith
 (1994, 1997), Kong (1995a, b, 1996a, b, c, 1997,
 1999), Leyshon et al. (1995, 1998), Waterman (1998),
 Gibson (1998, 1999), Connell and Gibson (2002),
 Gibson and Connell (2005). Key characteristics of
 these works are the attention paid to notions of
 identity, and intersections of the cultural, the eco-
 nomic, and the political. Here, I explore one dimen-
 sion of the cultural politics of music - the way in
 which music is used for political ends in Singapore
 through the state's creation of moral panics and the
 delineation of moral geographies, with the aim of
 constructing particular "Singaporean" identities. I
 also examine the negotiations on the ground and the
 re-interpretations of moralities in geographies and
 music.
 Using the Singapore case, I focus on the ways in
 which the state and sometimes, the mass media con-
 structed pop/rock music as a "folk devil" and created a
 "moral panic" (Cohen, 1972) in the 1970s. In the early
 1980s, the state's stance was resurrected by non-state
 agents, but with a more educated and vocal population,
 the attempt was thwarted with vociferous resistance
 from pop/rock followers. Though there was no panic on
 the scale of the 1970s, the state quietly continued to
 assert its stance about pop/rock through its regulatory
 powers. By the mid-1980s, however, the state appro-
 priated music so that it had become part of the ideo-
 logical and strategic apparatus contributing to the
 state's vision of a "nation", in particular, one that is
 morally cleansed, with state-defined contours of a moral
 geography. Music became a "moral guardian". The
 concern that rock/pop music poses a threat to social life,
 however, never fully disappears, and re-emerges at dif-
 ferent historical moments as the state seeks to reassert
 its version of the "nation". I examine the conditions of
 re-emergence in the early 1990s and explore the ways in
 which old fears are managed by the state and the music
 community under new social, economic and political
 conditions, including those of globalization. Finally, I
 examine developments since the late 1990s and partic-
 ularly in the 2000s, in which a new vibrancy is sought
 for Singapore, a desire to develop a kind of "hip",
 "happening" factor that Florida (2002) identifies as the
 distinguishing dynamic that will propel cities to success.
 In adopting these lines of analysis, the paper draws
 together three bodies of literature that have hitherto
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Thu, 14 Dec 2017 03:06:12 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Published in GeoJournal, Vol. 65, No. 1/2, (2006), pp. 103-111  
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-006-0013-1
 104
 developed separately: the geography of music, the cul-
 tural politics of music, and the sociology of deviance.
 Concepts and contexts
 Moral panics and moral geographies
 Sociological literature has explored the notion of moral
 panics, best developed in the work of Cohen (1972) and
 Hall et al. (1978). Moral panics are social constructions
 and open to ideological and political manoeuvrings. As
 Cohen (1972, p. 9) characterized it, moral panics may be
 understood as follows:
 A condition, episode, person or group of persons
 emerges to become defined as a threat to societal
 values and interests; its nature is presented in a styl-
 ized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the
 moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops,
 politicians and other right-thinking people; socially
 accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and
 solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often)
 resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges
 or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes
 the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times
 it is something which has been in existence long
 enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Some-
 times the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in
 folklore and collective memory; at other times it has
 more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might
 produce such changes as those in legal and social
 policy or even in the way the society conceives itself
 After the pioneering work of Cohen (1972) and
 Hall et al. (1978), a variety of sociologists have
 worked with the concept of moral panics. Writing
 two decades later, Goode and Ben- Yehuda (1994)
 summed up the key elements of a moral panic as
 follows: concern, hostility, consensus, disproportion-
 ality and volatility. In describing the reactions to
 rock, and subsequently, heavy metal music in Singa-
 pore, these elements emerge variously to represent
 music as a moral hazard.
 Let me turn for a moment from the sociological
 literature back to geography. While geographers have
 addressed issues of morality (Sack, 1999), most have
 dealt with questions of justice (Smith, 1998) in this
 regard. However, Matless (1995) has drawn attention
 to recent work on moral geographies, which deal with
 issues of control and exclusion in a variety of settings,
 from schools to military institutes, hospitals and asy-
 lums. Moral geographies deal with "different, often
 conflicting, ways of being-in-the-world" (Matless,
 1994, p. 130), and "judgements as to whether certain
 practices blend in to, or transgress, the landscape
 work through an appropriate moral geography of
 what belongs where" (Matless, 1995, p. 397). Moral
 geographies involve a "dominative power" of both
 "control and exclusion" as well as "performative
 powers of spatial practice" (Matless, 1995, p. 396).
 This is an important perspective in my subsequent
 analysis of struggles for control over musical activities
 and places in Singapore.
 Sociological and geographical literatures on music
 and moralities have not intersected much despite the
 potential and importance of a multidisciplinary
 approach. One exceptional example is Clarke's (1982)
 work on pop festivals in Britain. Clarke dealt with the
 mobilization of political support for and against pop
 festivals in Britain, analyzing views of participants and
 non-participants. He investigated how various interest
 groups responded to pop festivals and how, in the
 course of political struggle over time, a system of regu-
 lations arose which accommodated, rather than sup-
 pressed, pop festivals in British life. These regulations
 were not specific legislation (with one exception) but
 were highly informal, and succeeded because of "effec-
 tive political mobilization by festival supporters"
 (Clarke, 1982, p. 172). These were translated into con-
 crete actions such as negotiation between the local
 community and authorities, which reduced the unpre-
 dictability of the threat and the local impact of pop
 festivals (Clarke, 1982, p. 173). Clarke's work offers
 sociological insights into the construction of and resis-
 tances to moral panics, the place of legislation in man-
 aging a social and cultural practice, as well as a
 geographical understanding of what constitutes
 "appropriate place" for particular activities. This
 dovetailing of sociological and geographical perspec-
 tives reflects the potential for multidisciplinary per-
 spectives in understanding how forms of popular
 musical practice perpetuate and sustain dominant
 ideological values as well as represent a challenge to
 such values when they articulate an opposed "structure
 of feeling".
 With these theoretical ideas in mind, I will now
 examine various key events in the history of English
 pop/rock music in Singapore to illustrate the emergence
 of state-provoked moral panics and the subsequent
 appropriation of music for nation-building purposes,
 illustrating the investment of a re-configured morality
 in music. I will also examine the ways in which the
 music ommunity and the audience reacted to such
 con tructions. Specifically, I will focus on the following
 key historical moments: (1) the early 1970s crackdown
 on rock/pop music related activities and the construc-
 tio  of a moral panic; (2) the early 1980s public debate
on rock and pop and the ban on rock concerts at the
Natio al Theatre, but the absence of moral panics
 no etheless; (3) the 1985-1990 reclamation of rock/pop
 through a series of state-organized events; (4) the early
 to mid 1990s ban on slam-dancing and crackdown on
 drugs but the absence once again of widespread moral
 panics; (5) the mid-1990s reclaiming of music in
 re-defining the social heritage and identity of the
 "nation"; and (6) the attempt in the early and mid-
 20008 to create a more vibrant and trendy city, liveable
 and fun. In all of these, I examine the significance of
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 place and space in the social and political strategies of
 the state.
 Moral panics, moral guardians
 Cracking down on rock and pop
 My focus in this paper is Singapore's post-independence
 period spanning the early 1970s to the present (see
 Kong, 1999 for details of the development of English
 music in Singapore during this period). In early 1970
 rock and pop faced the first government action, with a
 ban on Sunday afternoon T-dances in nightclubs.1 The
 police refused to renew licences on the grounds that they
 were "bad for the character of teenagers" (ST, 4 January
 1970). In 1971, long hair on men was banned (ST, 26
 February 1971), because of its perceived association
 with hippism, yellow culture and a decadent lifestyle.
 Among the hardest hit were those in the entertainment,
 including music, industry. Entertainment taxes for live
 bands in nightclubs and restaurants were also increased
 by 100%, making it difficult to sustain live music (ST, 13
 May 1971). That same year, police rounded up 32 local
 and foreign pop musicians on suspicion of supplying
 drugs to teenage schoolgirls. Newspaper reports ran the
 story dramatically, highlighting "a drugged schoolgirl
 lying unconscious near a hotel" and the detention of
 foreign musicians performing at the hotel on suspicion
 of drug pushing (ST, 30 September 1971). They fuelled a
 moral panic, stoking parents' anxieties and erecting
 moral boundaries, in this case, to coincide with national
 boundaries, as immigration authorities were called in to
 police morality by keeping "decadent foreign influence"
 out. In July 1972, the action was extended into a three-
 night surveillance of almost all the nightspots along
 Orchard Road (the main shopping and entertainment
 street in Singapore) by the Central Narcotics Bureau,
 Customs and police, ordered by the Home Affairs
 Minister. The ensuing report noted that Singapore's
 drug scene resembled closely those of Western societies:
 young girls, invariably from good, middle class families,
 going high on drugs, waiting to be picked up and
 "bedded down" by boys after getting high. Invariably, it
 was highlighted, the sites of such misdemeanours were
 nightspots characterized by psychedelic lights, abstract
 art and loud "soul" music (ST, 8 July 1972), with hip-
 pies spotting long hair in bell bottoms. The local daily
 highlighted "loud 'soul' music" as a key feature of such
 places. Soon, the effort to define moral boundaries was
 extended to temporal exclusion as well, with the regu-
 lation of nightclub opening hours (ST, 14 June 1972).
 These episodes of the 1970s illustrated how the social
 construction of musical activities gave rise to the delin-
 eation of a moral geography whose contours were
 drawn at three scales: at the local level, to coincide with
 nightclubs, particularly those with live music; the global
 level, to coincide with national boundaries; and at the
 scale of the body, to coincide with personal styles.
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 Action was taken to police each of these moral bound-
 aries through the shaping of moral geographies. At the
 local level, nightclubs were condemned. Through sur-
 veillance, closure and/or taxation, they were marked out
 as sites of immorality. At the global level, the national
 boundaries were to serve as the borders of morality.
 Decadence was said to be the influence of the "west",
 and efforts had to be made to keep out such "western"
 influences. At the level of the body, certain sartorial and
 hair styles became markers of immorality; with the ban
 on long hair on men, male visitors were turned back at
 the airports, should they refuse to cut their locks.
 Morality found expression in geography, and defined
 identity.
 While geography lent itself to moral interpretation,
 so too did music. Not all music was demonized, how-
 ever. Music that did not have a time-honoured tradition,
 which emanated from the "other" (the "west"), and
 which encouraged a performativity that spotlighted the
 body through sensual dance was demonized. As appar-
 ent below, there were those who preserved western
 classical music from this scrutiny and ignominy.
 Debating moralities: the Tow Siang Hwa controversy
 After a decade in the doldrums for the rock and
 pop scene, in 1982, a local doctor, "lover of serious
 music" (emphasis added), and a strict Bible-Presbyter-
 ian, Dr Tow Siang Hwa, made an impassioned plea
 against rock music in his capacity as fund-raising chair
 for the Singapore Symphony Orchestra (ST, 9 December
 1982). He urged the authorities to wean young people
 from such "violent and destructive" forms of music,
 asking that they initiate a forward-looking scheme to
 inculcate in the young a liking and taste for "serious"
 music. His case against rock music similarly relied on
 the construction of various moral geographies and
 moral musics, undoubtedly rooted in his religious beliefs
 and musical tastes.
 As with the state in the 1970s, Tow appealed to the
 sense of national protection and nation-building needs,
 thus re-emphasizing contours of a moral geography at
 the scale of the global, distinguishing between a "moral"
 "national" polity and an immoral "rest of the world",
 particularly the "west". In this, he argued that to wean
 young people from rock was for "the benefit of the
 country's security", for a "small, closed society like
 Singapore" could not afford "this type of liberalization"
 (ST, 19 December 1982). He further delimited the
 boundaries of moral acceptability when he called for
 rock to be confined to private spaces: "There is nothing
 wrong with someone who wants to play or listen to rock
 music in the privacy in [sic] his [sic] own room. But when
 it's held in open spaces, there is always the potential of
 group influence on drugs and sex which go hand in hand
 with rock music". If rock concerts are held in open
 spaces such as the East Coast Park or Fort Canning
 Park, "there won't be any chair to break or fence to pull
 down, but think of the problem in controlling a crowd
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 of about 30,000 which is bound to gather for any big-
 name band" (ST, 19 December 1982). Within 2 days of
 Tow's tirade against rock music, the National Theatre
 banned rock concerts. While the act was unlikely a
 direct consequence of Tow's attack on rock music, it
 acted as a powerful endorsement of such views (ST, 1 1
 December 1982). In outlining the reasons for the ban, a
 government spokesperson made a point about "wanton
 vandalism" and "senseless outbursts", with unruly
 audiences that required control (ST, 1 1 December 1982).
 The specific performative aspect of music and the
 association of performances with unruly crowds was
 what particularly drew flak from Dr Tow and the state,
 more than the music and its text per se.
 Reactions to Tow and the National Theatre ban
 indicated that the rock/pop-loving public, concert pro-
 moters and some members of the media were not willing
 to allow the development of a moral panic and were
 ready to contest the constructed moral geographies. In
 the same way that Tow sought to contain rock music in
 private confines, members of the rock-loving public
 sought to isolate the occurrence of unruliness from the
 public spaces of music, thus liberating these spaces from
 conceptions of immorality. Specifically, they attempted
 to locate and hence localize the problem. Arguments
 were made that there had been no record of fighting
 where rock concerts were held, for example, inside the
 National Theatre. If any scuffles had occurred, they had
 only ever taken place outside the theatre. It therefore
 made no sense to ban the concerts when violence had
 not occurred at the actual site of performance (ST, 1 1
 December 1982).
 As another counter-hegemonic strategy, members of
 the public also sought to tease apart morality and music,
 making the argument that "there is nothing intrinsically
 immoral about rock music" (ST, 12 December 1982).
 This resonates with the view that music is connected
 with morality and civilization (Mclver, 2002), distin-
 guishing society from savagery. In making this point, a
 media commentary argued that it was at most a form of
 harmless catharsis and that there was nothing to be
 alarmed about (ST, 5 December 1983). Music itself, it
 was argued, had to be disengaged from constructions of
 immorality.
 By the early 1980s therefore, with a much more
 educated and vocal public, as well as a lack of wide-
 spread and recurrent state actions, a contestation of the
 imputed relationship between moralities and music, and
 moralities and geographies ensued as opposed to the
 escalation of a moral panic.
 Reclaiming rock and pop
 By the mid-1980s, it became apparent to the state that in
 order to stay in touch with the public, it had to
 acknowledge some of the public's social-cultural pref-
 erences and embrace some of its activities. This pro-
 pelled a slew of activities in the next few years that
 appropriated rock/pop to serve state objectives: the
 Singapore Police Force organized Police Rock Concerts
 (1985, 1986) and disco nights (1986, 1987), and the
 National Crime Prevention Council a Let's Rock Con-
 cert (1986). From 1988 to 1990, Orchard Road also
 came alive near National Day with the Swing Singapore
 party, organized by the Singapore Armed Forces
 Reservists Association (SAFRA) and then the Singa-
 pore Joint Civil Defence Force (SJCDF).
 Various consistent rationale underscored their
 occurrence. One was to create a better understanding
 between police and youth and for the police to remain
 "relevant" to their constituents (ST, 21 September
 1985); another was to act as moral guardians using rock/
 pop stars as models of morality, concerts to purvey
 moral messages, and discos and concerts to keep
 youngs ers off the streets. Hence, it was de rigeur to find
 messages on concert stage screens such as "Good times
 an go on for ver if you keep away from drugs", "Drop
 in at your local NPP",2 "Stay off gluc.it can lead to a
 sticky end..." (ST, 21 May 1986; 20 June 1986). At the
 same time, such events were aimed at drawing youths to
 " a e" activities so that they would not "hang around
feeling left out" or "create mischief (Ong Seng Chye,
 Director, Crime Prevention Division, quoted in ST,
 7 February 1986). As guardians of morality and good-
 ness, t ese events also sought to raise funds through
 ticket collections and donations for the Boys' Clubs and
 the Community Chest. However, reclaiming rock and
 pop in this way was not a risk-free enterprise, with the
 congregation of large crowds of enthusiastic youngsters.
 It was thus perhaps symbolic and strategic of the Police
 to "contain" the earliest of such events by holding them
 in the grounds of the Police Academy - home ground, as
 it were - simultaneously drawing on the symbolic capital
 of the place as the bastion of law and order.
 While the moral enterprise was direct and literal in
 the above examples, the contours of another moral
 geography were also being drawn through the reclama-
 tion of rock/pop and dance between 1988 and 1990. This
 was done through the Swing Singapore parties along
Orchard Road. They created an interlocking relation-
 ship between music and modernity through music's role
 in the celebration of the modern nation-state, con-
 structed simultaneously as a moral civilization. Precipi-
 tated by the overwhelming response to the Orchard
 Road Party on the eve of National Day 1988, the former
 Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and former First Dep-
 uty Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, suggested holding
 another party in the vicinity of Orchard Road on a
 much larger scale. Subsequently, the first Swing Singa-
 pore was held 3 weeks later and for another 2 years, with
 huge turnouts. Like the Police Rock Concerts and other
 similar events, Swing Singapore aimed to reach out to
 Singaporeans, this time, to celebrate their "insideness",
 their belonging to a "nation". As Singaporeans, they
 were invited to rejoice in their "nationhood" and
 identity, and revel in their belonging to the "inside"
 of "national" boundaries, "national" moralities, trans-
 lated as particular "national" values (particular rights/
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 way, rather than the earlier attempts to keep out "bad
 foreign influence" (defining what does not belong), the
 evidence in this period suggests the adoption of a reverse
 strategy, that is, moral geographies were being con-
 structed by defining what does belong. In either way,
 moral/national boundaries were being policed, and
 music played an integral role in both strategies.
 Banning slamming, prohibiting drugs: new moral panics?
 By the 1990s, the music, concert and club scene was
 undergoing a revival. Local English music had found a
 new lease of life, with the development of more local
 artistes and groups, including alternative or independent
 artistes who play a rather eclectic mix of musical genres,
 from folk (for example Humpback Oak and The
 Ordinary People) to punk rock (Opposition Party),
 hardcore (Stomping Ground, Swirling Madness), thrash
 and death metal (Detragrammatos, Profancer). Such
 "alternative" sounds had been made even more pop-
 ular amongst some of the young with live concerts
 by heavy metal groups such as Metallica and Bon Jo vi.
 As hardcore sounds found a following, so too did
 slam-dancing. These concerts and dances constituted
 the potential roots of renewed moral panics, as crowds
 of heavy metal fans fit the bill as "folk devils" and
 teenage slam-dancers represented "irrationality" and
 "violence". Thus, despite the general reluctance to
 demonise rock and pop in the 1980s, in the 1990s, the
 re-emergence in state discourse about the perils of
 western cultural influences and a re-assertion of "Asian
 (Confucian) values" (Kong and Yeoh, 2002) form the
 context for the decision to ban slam dancing in 1992. The
 Public Entertainment Licensing Unit introduced a new
 ruling in which all live performances required a permit,
 obliging concert organizers to stop a performance if they
 were unable to prevent the crowd from dancing vio-
 lently. In addition, organizers had to put down a $2000
 deposit for each gig and stood to lose the entire amount
 if the rule was broken. The new ruling made it difficult,
 even impossible, to organise gigs for hardcore, thrash
 and related musical genres, since slam-dancing was an
 integral part of these events (ST, 19 February 1993). This
 regulatory practice accompanied the media's moral
 crusade about the practice, in particular, a New Paper3
 report highlighting slam-dancing during a September 29
 gig by American punk group the Rollins Band, a report
 which even a Straits Times journalist labelled "rather
 alarmist" (ST, 19 February 1993).
 The New Paper report (1 October 1992) described it
 as "a pandemonium that seems so punishing it might
 put off a rugby player", "like a violent street scuffle",
 and resulting in exhausted, bruised and cut youngsters.
 The pictures depicted large and rowdy crowds of
 slam-dancers, described as sporting crew cuts, wearing
 army-type boots and dressed in black. Parents and
 grandparents were reported to be shocked by such
 activities, and interviews with parents revealed the moral
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 position they adopted against such "senselessness" and
 "violence". A 31 -year-old professional was quoted as
 saying, "It sounds ridiculous. I do not see myself doing
 something like that for fun. If I had a child, I certainly
 would not allow him to do it. He can go sailing or
 bowling or do something more sane" (The New Paper, 1
 October 1992). The police too took an unequivocal
 stance on this issue, declaring: "there will not be a review
 of the ban in the foreseeable future. In practice, patrons
 will find it extremely difficult to observe such rules. The
 heat of excitement often leads to spontaneous boisterous
 behaviour even within a controlled situation" (ST, 19
 February 1993). From an analytical perspective, such
 music as hardcore are more appropriately described as
 "sounds", uncivilized and savage, reinforced by the
 performativity of slam-dancing, characterized as violent.
 While the conditions existed for a moral panic to
 erupt (state legislation, press coverage, and concerned
 public), this did not happen for several reasons. First,
 unlike rock/pop in the 1970s, slam-dancing and the
 related hardcore music in the 1990s has a relatively small
 following. Perhaps consequently, there was no sense of
 widespread moral panic over an activity that "afflicted"
 only a small group. Second, a more vocal and educated
 population (compared to the 1970s) meant that partic-
 ipants (the folk devils) were more expressive in defence
 of their indulgence. Many erected forms of rationality in
 defence of the music and dance they found attractive.
 For example, as a way of reducing the unpredictability
 of behaviour, slam-dancers argued that it was a mis-
 conception that it caused danger to other concert-goers
 because there are rules to slamming (no kicking or
 punching; slamming only in front of the stage, so those
 who do not want to participate can sit further away; no
 studded boots; no poking of elbows into a partner's face
 or knees into his groin) (ST, 2 November 1992; 19
 February 1993). Further, the seeming violence was
 deemed the result of media sensationalism:
 one fine day, half of the population in Singapore
 picked up their daily papers to find the headlines
 splashed with large, vivid photographs of teenagers
 flying off a stage, followed by a report of interviews
 with some mothers or grandmothers being asked
 whether they would let their son do that. Their reac-
 tion, as reported, was filled with horror and revulsion
 when they were shown some of the photographs.
 Frankly, I am not surprised at the reactions because if
 I were to publish photographs depicting menacing
 ruggers in action and then go around asking people a
 similar question, I would probably get some negative
 reactions too (ST, 2 November 1992).
 Third, discontinuities within the media were partly
 instrumental in preventing a moral panic. In contrast to
 the report on slam-dancing in the New Paper, the Straits
 Times reported that there were no actual cases of inju-
 ries during slam-dancing (ST, 19 February 1993). Fur-
 ther Straits Times coverage of heavy metal concerts
 during this period were similarly assuring. For example,
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 while a Metallica concert in Jakarta had resulted in
 many cases of injuries, rioters and arson, the event in
 Singapore was said to have gone smoothly, thanks to
 "advance police planning". The state (represented by
 the police) was prepared to deal with any incidents, with
 abundant uniformed officers, police dogs, barricades
 and so forth. Yet, the preparations were described by
 the Director of Police Operations as "a fairly standard"
 operating procedure. By thus indicating a comfortable
 ability to deal with any potential problems, the police
 and the media conveyed a sense that panic was unwar-
 ranted. Similar treatment was given to a Bon Jo vi per-
 formance, with a prior Manila "riot" highlighted, the
 readiness of security officers in Singapore emphasized,
 and the subsequent trouble-free experience heralded
 (ST, 2 October 1993).
 In essence, the process at work was one of rational-
 izing music and its performance, taking it from the
 realm of the aesthetic and experiential into that of
 rationality, logic and planning, in order to make it
 comprehensible and hence acceptable. This was true of
 participants who sought to explain the rules of slam-
 dancing, just as it was true of the police who sought to
 introduce a planned framework within which music
 could be performed.
 The absence of widespread moral panic was again
 apparent in 1995 over a drug raid on the Zouk disco-
 theque in which several staff members and patrons were
 charged with possession of illegal drugs. The state once
 again acted swiftly, placing restrictions on opening
 hours, as in the 1970s. Yet, a moral panic did not emerge
 as in the 1970s, partly because of the initiative of
 members of the entertainment industry to establish a
 (media) space for themselves. It was also partly due to
 the willingness of the media to give them a voice. Thus,
 immediately after the Zouk drug raid, three nightspot
 owners contacted the Straits Times to curb any potential
 escalation of panic. In presenting their positions, they
 adopted three discursive strategies: first, to construct
 what is "rational"; second, to position themselves
 ideologically with the state; and third, perhaps most
 significantly, to "locate" the problem.
 The rationalization of music involved a strategy to
 construct actions as "rational" on the basis of economic
 principles. Hence, a disco operator argued: "No opera-
 tor in his right mind would allow the playground to be
 abused - it's not to his benefit. You have nothing to gain
 and a lot to lose". In treating the disco as a business
 venture, he reduced the argument to economic princi-
 ples, highlighting the financial losses arising from a fine,
 restricted opening hours, or closure, thus arguing and
 assuring the public that operators had a vested interest
 to keep their joints free of drugs.
 Second, these operators also sought to position
 themselves ideologically with the state, agreeing with the
 crackdown. Dennis Foo of Europa, declared:
 The authorities are aware of goings-on and are pre-
 pared to take a position on it. We're behind the Gov-
 ernment's efforts and if all the clubs can work within
 the parameters set by the Government, the industry
 has a healthy part to play too (ST, 8 April 1995).
 These arguments could work only if the incident at
 Zouk was isolated and treated as an aberration. To do
 so, the most common strategy that the other owners
 adopted was to locate the problem, thus localizing it.
 This was achieved in various ways.
 First, they tried to localize and isolate the "problem"
 by dissociating the problem from a "type" of place
 (nightclub, discotheque) and locating it in a particular
 place, Zouk. "What happened at Zouk ... was an iso-
 lated incident which did not reflect the state of the
 industry" (ST, 8 April 1995). Dissociating the problem
 from place types with specific characteristics illustrated
 that the problem was a one-off occurrence that had been
 effectively contained.
 Second, they tried to locate the problem as a
 "western" and "westernized" problem: "Drugs would
 be for people who have high exposure to Western
 culture, the trendies. That kind of trendiness is not
 reflected in our clubs" (Dennis Foo of Europa
 Holdings). By constructing his clubs as somehow
 "non-westernized" and "localized" meant a dissocia-
 tion from the problems of "westernization". Third,
 one owner tried to locate the problem by identifying
 and isolating the social groups that constituted the
 problem, defining them as what his clientele was not.
 His clientele was older, more conservative, main-
 stream executives who basically wanted to "unwind"
 and did not pose a drug problem. Fourth, in locating
 the problem "elsewhere" (where presumably security
 measures were not taken), owners could press the
 point that with sound security measures, the same
 problem would not be found on their premises. They
 highlighted a range of security measures to keep
 "undesirables" out, underscoring the role of policing.
 Finally, while some sought to locate the problem by
 associating it with particular kinds of music (for
 example, linking it with heavy metal establishments),
 others sought to liberate/absolve music by delinking
 music and the drug problem. One owner, for exam-
 ple, argued, "Just because you listen to reggae does
 not mean you have to smoke a joint" (ST, 8 April
 1995). In this way, an effort was made to retrieve
 both places and music from demonization.
 During this period of the early 1990s, moral geog-
 raphies were clearly being staked out. The "west" was
 immoral; the east was safe. A particular discotheque had
 permitted immoral activities; not all nightspots did.
 Further, music was not intrinsically immoral, even if
 certain music types seemed to be more frequently asso-
 ciated with immoral activities. The ability and desire
 among the state, the pubic and the interest groups to
 engage with the complexity of moralities, geographies
 and music made for a more nuanced approach to issues
 of "nation" and "identity", and obviated the escalation
 of a moral panic.
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 In the latter half of the 1990s, music's moral guardian
 role was to be revived in various ways. In 1996 and 1997,
 anti-drug abuse rock concerts were organized by the
 National Council Against Drug Abuse (NCADA). They
 were held at the Civic Plaza, Ngee Ann City, a favourite
 "hang-out" in the heart of Orchard Road for the "target
 group" (Personal correspondence, Central Narcotics
 Bureau, 20 March 1998). The choice was justified for it
 attracted large crowds of youths. The concerts show-
 cased local bands playing a fusion of mainstream pop as
 well as "indie" sounds. Band members and disc jockeys
 who had a strong following among youths (NCADA
 Report, 1995-1996, p. 24) incorporated anti-drug mes-
 sages into the show periodically, thereby helping the
 Council to "strengthen the national consensus of zero
 tolerance towards drugs abuse" (Personal correspon-
 dence, Central Narcotics Bureau, 20 March 1998). Far
 from a "folk devil", music's role as moral guardian
 seems ensconced.
 In 1996, the National Archives organized an exhibi-
 tion on Singapore's heritage of English "pop music"
 called Retrospin, in the process, constructing a new
 moral geography. Whereas in the past, musicians were
 regarded as "social pariahs", according to Reggie
 Verghese, a member of the 1960s pop group, Quests, the
 exhibition on popular music as part of Singapore's his-
 tory and heritage in 1996 gave rise to the recovery of
 music and re-definition of acceptability. Retrospin was
 essentially a celebratory history of local sounds,
 emphasizing the development of local talent and the
 movement towards "local content" (see Kong, 1999).
 This invention of heritage in Singapore's national
 agenda in recent years is part of an attempt to construct
 national myths, national identities and hopefully, by
 extension, national loyalties. Such efforts are paralleled
 particularly in Third World countries (recent ex-colo-
 nies) where the concern with a national past and the
 heritage it confers is a concern with independence - not
 so much political independence as effective indepen-
 dence, that is, a sense that people are bound as one and
 have a continuity of shared ideas, values and sentiments.
 In seeking to anchor Singaporeans, particularly young
 Singaporeans in this sense of heritage and belonging, the
 state is in fact drawing lines of morality between "us"
 and "them", the latter being made up of an increasingly
 westernized society, with "western" mores and values.
 Developing the anchors of "Asian" morality is thus
 viewed as a particularly important form of "psycho-
 logical defence", serving to bind Singaporeans to their
 country (ST, 16 December 1988). Music is reclaimed for
 this precise nation-building role, a distinct project of
 modernity.
 While looking to the sanitized past with a certain
 degree of selective amnesia, the state also looked to the
 present in its musical construction of a moral geogra-
 phy. In the 1990s, concert rules were relaxed, making it
 less restrictive and more attractive to performers and
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 audiences alike. From 1 October 1998, rules surround-
 ing the organizing and staging of concerts were revised.
 For example, whereas performers were previously not
 allowed to step down from the stage or mingle with the
 audience in any way during the performance, they were
 now allowed to do so for not more than 15 minutes for
 the entire concert unless otherwise stipulated by the
 licensing officer. Whereas no audience members were
 allowed on stage in the past, the licencee could now pre-
 select/limit the number of audience members who
 wished to go on stage to present flowers or perform with
 the artiste. Whereas dancing was not previously allowed,
 designated areas could now be provided for "the more
 limbered concert-goers to shake their hips and boogie"
 (ST, 5 October 1998). By August 2003, even bar-top
 dancing which had hitherto been prohibited, was
 allowed (Singapore Police Force Press Release, 8 July
 2003), following soon after pole-dancing appeared in
 coffeeshops in public housing estate coffeeshops.
 Why were the moral boundaries being relaxed? While
 the police acknowledged that it was easier to ban a show
 or prohibit dancing, it recognized that it was "a little too
 rigid" (ST, 5 October 1998). This change in attitude has
 come about within the context of broader transforma-
 tions in Singapore society. As part of globalization,
 Singaporeans have become plugged into the global
 economy and been open to other social-cultural prac-
 tices, facilitated by technology. At the same time, in
 order to develop Singapore as a global city, attractive to
 "foreign talent" from different parts of the world, the
 tate was cognizant of the fact that the city needed to be
 attractive in various ways, including culturally (see
 Kong, 2000). Providing a vibrant entertainment and arts
 scene was one way to offer the lifestyle that other global
 cities such as London and New York enjoyed, and
restrictive rules and regulations did little to create the
 desired quality entertainment and excitement (ST, 5
 October 1998). Relaxing the rules was thus one strategy.
 The boundaries of morality for music and performance
 were thus re-negotiated.
 Conclusions
 I began the paper advocating a need for multidisciplin-
 ary perspectives in the study of music and society,
 particularly, sociological and geographical approaches
 to the study of moralities and music, and moralities
 and geographies. Through such a combined approach,
 I have analysed English language music in post-
 independence Singapore, and illustrated how geography
 and music have simultaneously been moralized. Such
 constructed moralities and their intersections are
 medium and outcome of the state's desire to construct
 a distinctive social formation and cultural identity
 particular to Singapore.
 A consistent moral geography can be identified in
 state discourse over time, even though the words
 "moral" or "immoral geography" have not explicitly
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 been used by the state. This moral geography is con-
 structed at various scales. At the large scale - that of the
 national and global - moral geographies inscribed by
 the state demarcate national boundaries as the bound-
 aries within which morality resides and beyond which
 belong negative decadent forces. Particularly, the
 "west" is demonized while 'Asian values' are reified.
 Within national boundaries, national values and
 moralities reside and deserve to be preserved. At the
 scale of the local, moral geographies have also been
 constructed. Particular places and associated activities
 are thought to be morally damaging: these include
 nightclubs and discos, while public performance spaces
 such as the National Theatre and the Civic Plaza at
 Ngee Ann City have the potential to be contaminated if
 not carefully policed and rationally planned. Indeed,
 where it is critical for rationality to prevail during per-
 formance, the choice of performance space becomes a
 strategy of containment, such as when concerts are held
 in the grounds of the Police Academy. Further, at the
 spatial scale of the individual self, the body is also
 constructed as a site of moral judgement (long hair =
 immoral), and policing extended to the body in 1970s
 Singapore. In this approach, Singapore had the signal
 (dis)honour of being singular in its moral constructions
 and resultant constrictions.
 This constructed moral geography is sometimes
 simultaneously contested and appropriated by non-state
 agents such as rock lovers, disco and nightclub owners,
 and media commentators. Most commonly, the injunc-
 tion that the "west" is "less" in the morality scale is
 unchallenged, and attempts are made instead to recon-
 struct vilified space as non-western. Thus, some night-
 club owners construct themselves as more Asian than
 western, diverting attention from the music played to
 the social profile of clienteles. Others accept the poten-
 tial moral geography of the local, allowing that night-
 spots may accommodate immorality, but seek to
 distinguish between particular locales, thus localizing
 the problem and mapping a moral geography at a much
 finer scale.
 Turning from moralities and geographies to morali-
 ties and music, several cross-cutting constructions are
 observable. For the state, opposite stances are some-
 times apparent. Music of the "other" (defined as the
 "west") is constructed as immoral, and particularly,
 "new" music at particular historical moments, such as
 rock of the 1960s and 1970s, and hardcore in the 1990s.
 But more importantly, it is the performativity of music
 that tends to be demonized: the sensual body that is
 associated with dance, and the violent body that is
 associated both with particular dances, and crowds
 during public performance. In this regard, music is
 associated with savagery and aggression, constructed as
 carnal and base. On the other hand, during the later
 process of "nation" and "identity" construction, the
 state's appropriation of music through heritage recovery
 and hegemonic propaganda relied on a construction of
 music as associated with modernity, civilization and
 morality. Music heritage was constructed as belying the
 existence of a nation-state with a shared identity, an
 artifact of modernity. Music performance was con-
 structed as vehicles for the purveyance of morality and
 their successful execution (without violence) stood as
 symbols of rationality. Music idols were constructed as
 moral icons symbolic of civilized values.
 In reconciling what appear as contradictions, it is
 apparent that the type of music and performance
 endorsed by the state reflects the social formation and
 cultural milieu it desires for Singapore. Specifically, it is
 a social formation that is plugged into the global econ-
omy but socially and culturally anchored in Asian roots,
 abiding by certain moral codes of good/bad that are
 constructed as particularly "Asian". It is, above all, a
 social formation in which Singaporeans feel a sense of
 belo ging and "insideness".
 Moving way from the Singapore case, from a
 broader p rspective, this paper illustrates how geogra-
 phers addressing issues of morality need not deal
 exclusively with questions of justice as they have hith-
 erto done. Geographers have an expanded agenda to
 work with in issues of morality. At the same time,
sociologists and students of cultural studies examining
 mo al panics and the cultural politics of music may
 benefit from closer attention to the symbolism of place
 and the spatial scales of moral geographies. It is this
 rapprochement of different disciplinary perspectives that
 will allow for more fruitful insights into the nexus
 between the social, cultural, and political in musical
 analysis.
 Notes
 1. T-dances are short for "tea dances", that is, dances
 that are literally held at afternoon tea hours in
 nightclubs.
 2. NPP stands for Neighbourhood Police Post.
 3. The New Paper is a tabloid while the Straits Times is
 a broadsheet in Singapore.
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